In Tzahal (the Israeli armed forces), as you all know, every campaign, every period, every activity gets a code name, usually comprised of two words. Sometimes the computer chooses the name; sometimes the officers themselves search for a creative term that characterizes the event.

The present period in Tzahal is referred to as "the interim period" i.e. the period wherein the process of handing over jurisdiction of the cities of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinians has not yet been completed. According to the army's plans, this process will be completed before the "disengagement" – that is the official term used for uprooting the settlers of Azza and the northern part of Samaria. The purpose of this schedule is that the transfer in Azza should be seen as a segment of the agreement with the Palestinians which includes handing over the cities to them. The "golden path" or "middle road" is the code name for the days until the settlements in Azza are destroyed.

The period after the disengagement, the end of the summer, got the code name of "stormy day", not only because the winds of fall will already be blowing, but because of the army activities that are foreseen to be taking place then.

And the scenario that they are predicting forecasts "increased security level" with the Palestinians; that's the military jargon for renewed war with the Palestinians. The following is the course of events that the army is preparing for:

May/ June – preparations for the transfer

July/ August – destruction of the settlements and retreat of the army

September and October – violent confrontations with the Palestinians, which will require Tzahal to return and conquer the cities of Judea and Samaria

The amazing thing is that the state of Israel is advancing, with full knowledge and with open eyes, into this death trap. If the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in October 1973 was a surprise, the war of October 2005 is the most obviously expected fact. High level officers in Tzahal say so in the loudest and clearest tones in conversations held behind closed doors, in private briefings to anyone they speak to, including the media. Everyone knows this, including the Prime Minister and the Minister of defense, they who are pushing as hard as they can for this uprooting and expulsion to take place. The details of this scenario are portrayed clearly on power-point presentations that senior officers exhibit to government officials, to the committee for security and defense, and to everyone whom they feel should know.

To tell the truth, this is not the only scenario. The army also sees other possibilities developing, such as a precursor to a final settlement. Such a path, say the security personnel, will be, with absolute certainty, accompanied by terror, as has been the case in the past, terror along the path to peace.

These are the only two possibilities foreseen for the days after the transfer, in terms of what Tzahahl is preparing for: if there will be a political agreement, then there will be terror, if there will be no such agreement, there will be war.

In the future – explosive devices in Yesha

These evaluations of the state of affairs are not the result of some wild imaginary mind. Reliable intelligence information sources reveal that in the recent past the smuggling of arms into Yesha has increased as preparation for the violence that will begin right after the disengagement.

This smuggling of arms occurs on the border between Egypt and the Negev, and from there to the area south of Chevron, and from there to all over Yesha.  The attempts at smuggling include RPG anti-tank rockets, and other explosive devices, the likes of which have not been seen in Yesha for over two years, since the base of the terror of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria was destroyed in the "Defensive Wall" campaign. The significance of this is that there will again be explosive devices placed on main traffic arteries in Yesha, highways that thousands of Israelis travel every day. Senior officials in the central division of the army describe this smuggling as "the main threat" today to the state of Israel. It is even more of a threat than the attempts to develop sophisticated long range rockets such as the Kassam and other mortar shells that have been evidenced in Yesha. It is not hard to guess what will be the state of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians after an Israeli family will be, G-d forbid, murdered in their car from such an explosive device. Tzahal sees this as an acceptable event after the disengagement. "Windy Day" may soon prove to be an overly optimistic code name.

Facts that were published this week by the security system show that since early 2005 and as of last week, there were 30 odd smuggling events of ammunition from the area of Sinai, some into the Azza area and some to the Negev. According to intelligence sources, from the beginning of the year approximately one thousand rifles, tens of RPG rocket propellers, 150 pistols, and tens of thousands of bullets have been smuggled in. In the last month alone the Hammas smuggled 600 rifles and many crates of ammunition into Azza. It appears that they also smuggled, during the month of March via tunnels into Azza, 5 anti-aircraft shoulder rocket launchers. This smuggling was carried out with the cooperation of the Palestinian army intelligence and the Hammas. The Israeli security sources say that the terrorist organizations have increased their efforts, during this "ceasefire" period, to smuggle all types of ammunition into Azza and Israel.

And if we are discussing smuggling, Tzahal also identified a smuggling route, mainly for  rifles, from Azza to Yesha, and another route of ammunition, in the opposite direction, from Yesha to Azza. The reason seems to be economic. The lack of bullets in Azza raised the price of each bullet to 30 shekel, where as in Yesha they only cost 10 shekel.

No one wants the cities of Shchem and Jenin

The security system had hoped that at this point they would already be "after" the stage of handing over the third city, Kalkilya, to Palestinian jurisdiction. However, the attempt to hand over two other cities, Jericho and Tul Karem, brought about a "freeze" in the process. On the very eve of handing over the cities, Israel gave the Palestinians a list of fugitives, along with an agreement that they would not be arrested if they were to sign a form obliging them to cease from engaging in all terrorist activities, and hand in their arms. The Palestinians fulfilled exactly one half of the agreement. Most of the fugitives indeed signed as requested, but all refused to hand over their guns. The Israelis indicated that they would agree to a compromise wherein the Palestinians would store the guns in an agreed upon armory.

The Palestinians refused to do so. As a result the Israelis will not hand over Kalkilya until the situation in Tul Karem and Jericho is settled i.e. orderly lists handed in and arms collected.

Tzahal is also interested in handing over Shchem and Jenin to the Palestinians before Rammallah and Bethlehem, because the separating wall that is to "wrap" around Jerusalem is not yet completed, and the Israelis fear for the proximity of those cities to Jerusalem. In addition the Israelis want to force the leaders of the Palestinian authority to deal with the very base of the terrorist networks that exist in Shchem and Jenin. To the surprise of the officers, the Palestinians didn't even raise the issue of Shchem and Jenin at their deliberations.

What exactly does the term "thwart" mean?

Fifty planned terrorist attacks have been thwarted since the Shaarem conference. A tenth of them, between five and seven, were thwarted by the Palestinians.

This statistic needs explanation as to what is meant by the term "thwart". When Tzahal reports that it has" thwarted" a terrorist attack, they mean that they have discovered the base of the terrorists, have found the explosive device or belt, and a terrorist has been killed or arrested.  But the Palestinians have a different definition. In at least two instances they handed over two explosive belts that were ready to be put into use, but  -- who was the terrorist who was to use them? Was he jailed" To what terrorist organization did he belong? In regard to all these questions, the Palestinians were miserly in giving answers.  Tzahal takes care to use the terminology "the Palestinians have been thwarting the plans of the terrorists". They don't use the term "thwarting terror", but rather "thwarting intention". When the Palestinian security organization has information they call the terrorist, warn him, and hand over his belt, and that's it. No arrests. Obviously this is not "dismantling the basis of the terrorist network"—that term that doesn't exist at all in the Palestinian lexicon. What they  are doing is merely giving information and preventing.

That was this case with the terrorist from Shchem who tried to carry out a terrorist attack. The Palestinian authorities called him in for a conversation; he was convinced and changed his mind about carrying out the terrorist attack, and handed over the belt. Is this called prevention? A source in the army answered: from our point of view, the terrorist action was prevented.

In American they poke fun at the disengagement

If the secretary of state Sylvan Shalom would take some time out from his many trips to various Arab countries, and look at some of the reports that come to his office from the various embassies and consulates in the USA, he will find some fascinating pieces of information. For example, most of the liberal and academic circles in the USA, those who support the idea of Israel leaving all of Yesha are poking fun at the plan for disengagement, criticizing it strongly and ridiculing it.

From these reports it becomes evident that the credit that Sharon supposedly received from the USA, from those circles who set the general public opinion, does not exist. And therefore after the retreat, the pressure of the Americans will only increase, with further demands to retreat, and further dismantling of settlements; this too in a one sided manner. The voices emanating from those circles say that if Sharon will not continue the retreat, it will prove that all he planned to do was annex more territories with no reason.

According to these reports, the disengagement plan completely negated the two supposed central political principles of Israel in the US that have been in existence for the last 38 years. And this is obvious from the reactions of these circles to the disengagement plan. First of all-- the security contention. Liberal American circles say that the very decision to carry out one sided retreat, including uprooting settlements with no significant retribution form the Palestinians, completely negates the contention that the settlements have security importance. The implication is that if Sharon will refuse to continue with his retreat, this will be proof that he plans to annex the "west bank". And this is a step that they will thwart with all the power that they can amass.

Sharon also did away with the moral contention that is based on the moral right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. According to these circles, as is reflected in the reports that arrived in the ministry of state, the very willingness for a one sided retreat and the willingness to dismantle settlements goes to prove that there is no basis for the contention that the Jewish people have a moral connection to this land. Once the moral connection to the land is gone, Sharon will be forced to make peace with the idea that he must retreat up to the green line. Therefore Israeli consuls and ambassadors have been warning that Sharon will get no support for his plan to stop the retreat after dismantling the settlements of Azza, and if he does so, the relationship between Israel and the USA will reach a level of extremely strong confrontation, more so than if Sharon had not initiated this one sided uprooting.

It would be folly to ignore the influence of these circles. These are the thoughts of the thinkers who make and lead the public opinion of the academic world. In circles of political science and study of the Middle East in various universities in the USA, such as Harvard and MIT, these opinions have mighty influence.

These reports came at the initiative of the foreign ministry who recently sent directives to ambassadors the world over to organize support for the disengagement plan and to examine the sentiments in different communities about this plan. Several of the reports, especially from Israeli representatives who canvassed only the Jewish communities reported general support for the plan among Jews. According to these reports, it appears that in most circles the orthodox communities oppose the uprooting of Jews. In other communities, such as conservative and reform, there is support for the plan.

The commander who is above the chief of staff

Several weeks ago, the chief of staff visited one of the battalions serving in Shomron. The soldiers with whom he met got permission to speak to him. One of the soldiers, who sported a crocheted Kippa, rose and said to the chief of staff, in a very clear and calm tone: Sir Chief of Staff, the battalion commander is my commander and you are his commander. But our Commander is above the battalion commander and above you.

Everyone, including the chief of staff, understood what he meant when he referred to "Our Commander" he who is above the battalion commander and the chief of staff. And it was clear that the soldier did not refer to Mofaz (the secretary of defense).

In Tzahal it has already been accepted that the appraisal regarding the number of those who will refuse to obey commands related to disengagement, from among the regular (as opposed to those doing reserve duty,) soldiers, will not be a one digit number. And will probably be more that several tens of soldiers, if not much more than that. Among senior officers in the arm one can hear the opinion that Tzahal will be wise if it will not act according to the letter of the law with these "refusers", will not pressure them into a corner, and will not bring about impossible situations. Very senior officers are talking of the importance of using a minimal number of soldiers for the disengagement, and using soldiers of Tzahal only for tasks that are related to the closing of major thoroughfares and military areas. In that way the soldiers will have no contact with the people in the settlements, but only with outsiders; and thus the soldiers will not be brought face to face with the trauma of the expulsion.

These may be the intentions; the actual plans are quite different. For, in opposition to the desires of these soldiers, the decision will ultimately be made, according to the size of the forces.  And as it looks now, in opposition to the original plans, the soldiers of Tzahal, at least in Azza, will be among the first circle of those expelling the settlers and not only the outer rings. All this because of a lack of manpower in the police force.

Tzahal sees the situation that way, and this seems to be a correct evaluation, as during the process of uprooting settlements, close to 100,000 citizens from all around the country will get to the area and will try to prevent the carrying out of this plan with their very bodies. In conversations behind closed doors one can hear senior officers talking of this number as decidedly realistic.